The last election was difficult for French President Emmanuel Macron. While he won the presidential election, his party, Renaissance, failed to claim a majority in the French Parliament. As a result, the Senate remains dominated by the conservative party Les Républicains, and the National assembly is fragmented, obliging the President to accept compromises to receive support from other parties, generally on the right.
The parties on the left (La France Insoumise of populist leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon) and on the far-right (Rassemblement National of Marine Le Pen) received more support than expected, and by disturbing the debates, made it difficult for Macron to push his reforms.
In addition, the French President gives the impression that he is not very present on the French scene. His government, led by a solid Prime minister from the left, seems to limit itself to managing crises without a clear political ambition.
Macron’s only serious political initiative, the creation of a National Council for Refoundation, was a failure due to a lack of support from political forces. The initiative sought to bring together representatives of political parties, social partners, local elected officials, representatives of the economic world, and the associative world” to move the country forward in a spirited dialogue and shared responsibilities.”
As a result, Macron has lost his popularity: in one of the recent polls (November Ipsos-Le Point barometer) he received a mere 36% of positive opinions, a drop of 7% since September, and his lowest level since January 2021, when there was a crisis due to COVID.
But the situation is worse in the field of European and international affairs.
Macron insisted on maintaining contact with President Putin, hoping to facilitate peace negotiations and prevent abuses by the Red Army against civilians. However, except for Putin’s acceptance of the presence of inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, he did not obtain any other results than critics from Ukraine and eastern members of the European Union, such as the Czech Republic and Poland.
At the same time, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz seems to pursue a path that changes the nature of the relations between Paris and Berlin. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel and her predecessors have always sought cooperation with the French presidents, and the French-German couple has until now been the motor of the European Union. With Scholz, this has changed. Scholtz, who has not the same authority in Germany as his predecessors, has taken unilateral decisions against this tradition.
For example, Germany has announced its decision to offer €200bn ($208bn) in state aid to businesses and households to get them through the energy crisis without discussing it with its partners, France included. This decision will create severe economic distortions because other European countries cannot compete with that level of subsidy. Scholtz also seems content to leave European defense initiatives on hold, including the European programs concerning warplanes and tanks.
Also, without first exchanging and finding a compromise, France and Germany disagreed over a cap on gas prices, which France wanted, and Germany did not. And, when France, the rest of Europe, and the US were reluctant to emphasize the collaboration with China, Scholtz went to meet the Chinese leadership, the first visit of an EU and G7 leader in China since the start of the pandemic almost three years ago.
Macron’s headaches do not stop there. The arrival of populist Giorgia Meloni as Italy’s Prime Minister in October was not good news for Macron, threatened in France by Marine Le Pen, a supporter of Meloni. The first clash happened some days ago, when according to Politico, ” Paris froze plans to take in 3,500 migrants from Italy, part of a European redistribution deal, and suggested other countries follow suit after Italy refused to allow the NGO vessel Ocean Viking to land, directing it to France instead.”
Macron also decided to strengthen the controls at the border with Italy against migrant crossings. But, like Scholts, Meloni is not Macron’s supporter, leaving Europe without its usual pilots.
This shift is unfortunate news for the United States, as Macron has been a strong ally and brought European Union’s support to the US foreign policy, particularly for the sanctions against Russia and the pressure to apply on China. Moreover, the German chancellor faces economic pressure as their gas industry relies mainly on Russian gas. Therefore, Scholz is looking for trade opportunities, particularly in China, even if his visit was unsuccessful.
Other countries, such as Italy or Sweden, are governed by or with far-right parties, which have often declared their skepticism about the usefulness of Russian sanctions and are courted by the Chinese leadership. How long will it take for France to be in the same situation? When Macron steps down, what will then happen with NATO?
